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BOOK REVIEWS
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE. By John Evarts
Tracy. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1952. Pp. xviii, 382.
$5.35.
Professor Tracy's preface does not make it clear for whom this book is
primarily intended. He says that the functions of "the one-volume treatise
have been to serve as a text for those undertaking to study law by the text-
book method . . ., to serve as collateral reading by those studying evi-
dence by the case method, and to serve the interests of the practicing bar."
For the bar, he continues, such a treatise fills two needs: "one, the needs of
the young attorney who must have in his library some book on evidence,
but who cannot yet afford to purchase one of the exhaustive works; the
other, to serve the interests of the busy trial attorney, as a refresher before
going into court, or for quick investigation of a problem arising in the
middle of a trial." This certainly seems to imply that the book is directed
to law students, among others, although it is to be noted that the author
concludes his preface by expressing the hope that the book will be well
received by the "practicing bar."
The point of all this is that while it is possible that the book has value
for the trial lawyer as a "refresher" (although, as will be pointed out, the
treatment of many of the rules of evidence is very sketchy and superficial),
it seems to me quite clear that it is not suitable for law school or law
student use, because of its general and superficial character and because it is
demonstrably incomplete and inaccurate in some particulars. It appears
correct to say that in his effort to condense and simplify, the author has
over-simplified and over-generalized to the point that in some areas the
result may very well mislead any but the already well-informed student of
the subject.
I certainly do not mean to say that all parts of the book are subject
to this criticism. Much of it is good and there are passages which are
excellent. For example, the chapters on judicial admissions, burden of
proof and presumptions, documentary evidence, and the parol evidence rule,
while rather general and elementary, seem to me adequate in an abbreviated
book of this type. Also, the book contains an excellent condensation of the
rules regulating the admissibility of the record of a past recollection, an
unusually lucid exposition of the problem of the admissibility of intra-
organizational reports and a convincing protest against the "res gestae"
terminology.
But the book is spotty. As to the matter of over-generality, the fol-
lowing instances are illustrative. In the treatment of the Dead Man's
Statute (pp. 123-5), no attempt is made to identify the traditional justifica-
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tion for the rule; while the decline and fall of the rule rendering one spouse
incompetent to testify for the other and the present status of the privilege
protecting confidential communications between husband and wife are ade-
quately presented (pp. 128-9, 133-5), there is only the most oblique refer-
ence to the privilege against adverse marital testimony, still recognized in
many states and (in respect to criminal trials) in most of the federal cir-
cuits. The discussion of the self-crimination privilege includes no refer-
ence to the question whether a claim of privilege is essential to immunity.
The treatment of the difficult "link in the chain" problem, touching the rules
to be applied in determining whether a particular question calls for in-
criminating matter, is limited to two sentences.' The discussion of the
tenor of the Federal or American rule restricting the scope of cross-
examination is very sketchy, limited to the one sentence.2 In a paragraph
explaining the purposes of cross-examination (pp. 176-7), no mention is
made of the possibility of developing on cross-examination the making of a
prior inconsistent statement. In dealing with the use of a memorandum
to refresh a witness' recollection (pp. 179-180), the author adopts without
qualification the rule, which doubtless reflects the view of most informed
students of the subject namely, "that it is immaterial, as a matter of law,
what the document handed to the witness is," "it makes no difference what
is the source of the writing, by whom it was made or when." But, un-
justifiably, I think, he fails to include any sort of caveat of the existence of
a much more restrictive rule in a substantial number of jurisdictions.3 In
dealing with the admissibility of prior consistent statements for rehabilita-
tion purposes (pp. 199-200), he makes no mention of the possibility of a
strong logical argument for admissibility on the issue of the making of an
inconsistent statement, where the opponent contends but the witness denies
that he has been inconsistent. The author has considerable to say about
the admissibility of lay opinion (pp. 202 et seq.) where the testimony can be
said to be merely a "shorthand rendering of the facts," or where "the whole
story cannot be given without a summing up by the witness," but nothing
explicit about the unifying principle explanatory of most decisions admitting
lay opinion, namely, the impossibility, by the nature of the situation, of the
witness reproducing to the jury, in words, the basic facts upon which his
opinion depends. Moreover, I find no reference whatever to the question as
to whether an opinion, otherwise admissible, is to be rejected because it
goes to the "ultimate question in the case," "the very question the jury is to
1. "The fact sought to be elicited may not in itself directly incriminate the witness,
but may be one in a series of facts from which the guilt of the person could be inferred.
Therefore, the rule is well settled that the privilege can be invoked not only for the
facts that do incriminate but also for facts that tend to incriminate." (p. 149).
2. "The cross-examination is not limited to the exact questions asked the witness
on direct examination; where the direct examination opens a general subject, the cross-
examiner may go into any phase of that subject." (p. 176).
3. E.g., the California rule: "A witness is allowed to refresh his memory respect-
ing a fact, by anything written by himself, or under his direction, at the time when the
fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh
in his memory, and he knew that the same was correctly stated in the writing .
CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. ANN. § 2047 (Deering 1949).
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decide." 4 The discussion of agents' admissions (p. 238) seems to me not
sufficiently precise in pointing up the distinction between authorized conduct
and authorized speaking. The short discussion of the admissibility of the
declarations of a co-conspirator (p. 239) makes no reference to the tradi-
tional requirement, that, to be admissible, the declaration must have been
made in furtherance of the conspiracy; the implication, at least, being that
any declaration is admissible if made before the termination of the con-
spiracy. The chapter on hearsay (pp. 218 et seq.) omits all reference to
the Wright v. Tatham problem, conduct or silence as hearsay. In the
treatment of the requirements for the use of former testimony (pp. 250-
253), nothing is said about the rule of many cases that identity of opponent
is not enough, that there must be an identity of parties on both sides, the
so-called "mutuality" or "reciprocity" doctrine." Also, the requirement
of identity of parties is satisfied, it is said, in the view of "most courts,"
if the former hearing was between the same parties "or parties having
identical interests," no reference being made to holdings requiring not
merely "identical interests" but legal privity.6
Then, there appear to me to be substantial defects of commission as
well as of omission. Thus: "Immateriality" means that "even though
relevant, [the evidence] is so unimportant when compared to an abundance
bf evidence easily available that the time of the court should not be wasted
in considering it, particularly if its consideration would involve lengthy
collateral issues." (p. 5) I had assumed that, speaking correctly, "ma-
terial" signifies "important" or "significant" under the applicable substan-
tive law and under the pleadings.7 "Direct" and "circumstantial" evidence
are correctly defined in abstract terms, (p. 6) but I question as an example
of "direct" evidence, "The witness saw the defendant riding a stolen horse,"
if the charge be larceny, which seems to be assumed. It is said that if a
plaintiff makes a "prima facie" case, viz., if he.produces sufficient evidence
to withstand a motion for a non-suit, he is entitled to a directed verdict if
defendant produces no evidence. (p. 22) There is language which seems
to mean that it is only what the client tells his lawyer, not the advice given
by the lawyer to the client, which is within the protection of the attorney-
client privilege. (p. 140) We learn that a cross-examiner may ask "ap-
parently irrelevant" questions, and that if "asked to state the relevancy of
a question, he need not do so." (p. 178) It is said that it is the
"thoroughly established rule" that a foundation must be laid for the proof
4. See Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646
(1942); People v. Wilson, 25 Cal.2d 341, 153 P.2d 720 (1944).
5. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. v. Gumby, 99 Fed. 192 (1900) ; Mclnturff v. Ins. Co.,
248 Ili. 92, 93 N.E. 369 (1910).
6. See WIGMORE, EvmzNcE § 1388 (3d ed. 1940).
7. "Immaterial, in strictness, signifies that the offered evidential fact is directed
to prove some probandum which is not properly in issue. The rules of substantive
law and of pleading are what determine immateriality; and if the probandum is im-
material, of course no evidence to prove it is wanted." WIGMORE, STUDENTs' TExT-
13o0 § 16 (1935) ; see also, James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CAl.. L.
REv. 689 (1941).
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of a subsequent as well as a prior inconsistent statement (p. 187), no note
being made of an evident modern trend to dispense with the requirement
when a foundation is not possible.8 We are told that where an impeaching
witness testifies that the first witness' reputation for truth and veracity is
bad, the additional question, "From such reputation, would he believe him
on oath ?", is not only permitted but required in most jurisdictions. (p. 191)
The single case cited for this novel proposition merely holds that the ques-
tion is proper. As to impeaching one's own witness by evidence of a prior
contradictory statement, the only prerequisite is surprise (p. 194), no men-
tion being made of the many cases holding that, in addition, the testimony
must have been damaging to the proponent's case. The interpretation of
Ehner v. Fessenden 9 (the "arsenic in the silk" case) seems questionable.
(p. 296) This case (opinion by Holmes), which in the author's view
exemplifies a "somewhat puzzling use of the exception to the hearsay rule
[which accommodates contemporary declarations of a material mental
state]," I have always regarded as entirely orthodox and understandable.
Also, the criticism (p. 223) of Hanson v. Johnson,'0 the "corn-crib" case
(which holds admissible evidence of an utterance constituting the verbal
part of a material act), seems clearly unsound. Based on the Minnesota
cases only, there appears the statement, in effect (p. 303), that a party may
not testify to his own prior out-of-court statement even though the state-
ment qualifies as an excited utterance (spontaneous exclamation). This is
clearly wrong on principle because the fact that a statement is "self-serving"
in itself offers no basis for exclusion.1 It seems unfortunate to appear
to accord this Minnesota quirk the standing of prevailing doctrine. Again,
it is stated (p. 303) that "in many exceptions to the hearsay rule fhe state-
ment will not be received if it is self-serving." It is of course true that
the fact stated must have been disserving when stated if the declaration
is to qualify as a statement of fact against interest, but I think it is not
correct to say that a statement is disqualified under any other exception
to the hearsay rule merely because it is "self-serving."
The need of a first-rate, up-to-date student text on the law of evi-
dence is obvious to all evidence teachers. The announcement of the pub-
lication of this book engendered hope that it might be the answer. But I
do not think that this hope has been fulfilled.
Judson F. Falknor t
8. See, e.g., People v. Collup, 27 Cal.2d 829, 167 P.2d 714 (1946).
9. 151 Mass. 359, 24 N.E. 208 (1889).
10. 161 Minn. 229, 201 N.W. 322 (1924).
11. "In fact, there is no principle of evidence especially excluding self-serving
statements by an accused or any one else. If they are inadmissible, it is because they
are hearsay, or because of some other reason." Blume, J., in Worth v. Worth, 48
Wyo. 441, 468-9, 49 P.2d 649, 659 (1935).
t Professor of Law, University of California.
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THE BLACK MARKET: A STUDY OF WHITE COLLAR
CRIME. By Marshall B. Clinard. Rinehart & Co., New York,
1952. Pp. xvii, 392. $5.00.
This volume deals with the enforcement aspects of the government's
attempt to impose direct economic controls during and after World War II.
The Office of Price Administration was established early in 1942 and con-
tinued until May 31, 1947, a little more than five years. For part of that
time (December 1942-September 1945) the author of this book was a mem-
ber of the Enforcement Department, Office of Price Administration, and
as Chief of the Analysis and Reports Branch, he had important official
responsibilities for the gathering and interpreting of materials relating to
the enforcement of price regulations. Aside from official duties, this con-
nection also made possible a wide range of observation and extensive con-
tacts invaluable for research on the problem of the violation of price control
regulations. The volume under review is the product of this association,
viewed in the light of a sociologically oriented criminologist's perspective on
non-conforming behavior among the educated and well-to-do.
The book contains thirteen chapters, documented with thirty-four
significant statistical tables and three charts or figures. An appendix gives
a seven-page "Classification of Price, Rent, and Rationing Violations" as
of 1944. There is an adequate general index and a good, selected bibli-
ography, especially useful for its listing of pertinent government publica-
tions and the record of appropriate congressional hearings and of congres-
sional committee reports.
Experience in World War I with shortages, profiteering, and sky-high
prices for every day essentials set the stage for the economic controls of
World War II. Under the 1920 amendment to the National Defense Act,
the development of plans for effective industrial mobilization became the
responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of War. The War Department's
first published Mobilization Plan (1931) provided for price controls and
the 1939 revision of this plan elaborated and extended the range of con-
trols planned. In practice, voluntary controls were first attempted, but
shortly after Pearl Harbor, the government was granted statutory powers
to regulate extensive areas of our industrial and commercial life, including
wage-price-rent controls and consumer rationing. Subsequently the Office
of Price Administration issued over 600 price and rent regulations affecting
the prices of over 8,000,000 articles and 20 categories of rationed com-
modities. (Pp. 6-8)
The regulations were hardly in effect before violations began to occur.
"During the war at least a million cases of black market violations were
dealt with by the government. Illegal profits ran into billions of dollars."
(Preface, p. vii) The extent of violations became enormous. Thus in
1945 the Meat Packers Association of Greater Cincinnati estimated that
".. . fifty to seventy-five per cent of all civilian meat was passing in black
market channels." (p. 30) A Washington, D.C., survey of food retailers
indicated that in their opinion probably only one out of two wholesalers
1953]
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observed price ceilings. (p. 31) The whole story is a sordid picture of
widespread violation of law, despite the national crisis, in order to gain
bigger business profits. The enforcement activity of the OPA thus reveals
part of the extensive cheating and widespread dishonesty on the part of the
well-fed and prosperous Americans on the home front.
Professor Clinard has used admirable restraint in his analysis of this
unsavory chapter of American national life. There is neither moralizing
nor partisan table-thumping, but instead a dispassionate analysis of the
objective record coupled with a balanced discussion of the imponderable
"why's" of such widespread collective dishonesty and the almost uniform
respectability of crooked dealings undertaken to evade price controls. It
is this balanced discussion that gives the book significance as a further con-
tribution to the better formulation of a more adequate theory of crime and
criminal behavior.
The theoretical discussion centers in the five concluding chapters:
Chapter 9, "Black Market Violations as 'Crimes' "--the author contends
that they are "real" crimes; Chapter 10, "Were Black Market Violations
Unique?"-no, the author points out many other familiar kinds of busi-
ness crimes and argues that the patterns are highly similar; Chapter 11,
"Explanations of Black Market Violations"--mostly negative in showing
in detail that many familiar explanations of crime generally, and of economic
crime particularly, simply do not apply to black market activities but that
deep-seated cultural and ethical differences among people, businessmen
and consumers equally, do point the way to meaningful explanations;
Chapter 12, "The Black Market and Disorganization in Our Society"--
an exposition of some of the serious value conflicts in modern society that
underlie fhe evident philosophy that law does not apply to certain groups,
or is unfair and therefore not to be obeyed; Chapter 13, "The Black Market
in the Future"-an expectation of" . not less, but more violations; not
half compliance, but considerably less than half." (p. 358)
Professor Clinard's provocative analysis should lielp clarify the appeal-
ing but ambiguous concept of "white collar crime" first given systematic
delineation by the late Professor E. H. Sutherland. It is unfortunate that
some of the more telling distinctions made (e.g., p. 311, note on "differential
association") have been spelled out in footnotes rather than incorporated
into the main body of the text. A more important limitation, in the opinion
of this reviewer, is the omission of any consideration of the hectic and some-
what furious political battle that has centered on the whole idea of direct
price controls.
Important economic and political groups have long been joined in a
bitter struggle for power and influence in America. The significance of
the price control experiment lies in good part in the fact that it represented
a battlefield for this struggle, as well as in the fact that it involved a reversal
of traditional practice and thinking.
The familiar retort of the typical businessman to the charge of profiteer-
ing-"Since when has it been a crime to make a profit?"; or the more self-
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justifying one, "No one is forced to buy. If a customer wants my goods
enough to pay the price I ask, then it is good business to make a sale, cer-
tainly not a crime"--represents a point of view in American economic life
and culture that comes very close to being its central axis of organization.
To expect this basic orientation to change merely because a legislative
majority has adopted as law certain provisions that would regulate the
price (and the profits) that the businessman may ask, and has set up a
schedule of penalties to implement the declaration of principle that viola-
tion constitutes "crime," is to lose sight of the uncertain balance of power
that lies back of the organization of any democratic government. With
changes in political majorities, attempts at price control also changed. On
the whole, there is a fairly close parallel between price control efforts and
our experience with prohibition legislation. Violations were finally ter-
minated by abolishing the law that created the violations.
The point to note in this is that impressive legislative majorities do not
mean always that basic attitudes and the fundamental mores of a culture
have changed to correspond with such political action. It is futile and
meaningless to try to convict a nation of treason to itself. To designate
the culturally approved behavior of important, respected, and dominant
elements in a population as "crime," and to label the "pillars" of that society
as "white collar criminals" will appear to many to be an enterprise of similar
proportions.
The widespread violations of OPA regulations-the substantial basis
of what is called 'black market"--need to be viewed in the perspective of
basic cleavages in American political life. The bitter exchange between
OPA Administrator Bowles and Senator Taft, reported in some detail
on pages 108-110, is significant primarily because it is symptomatic of the
fundamental and deepseated political alignments represented by each.
Professor Clinard's book would have been an even more compelling
document of a significant episode in American life if the analysis had been
presented against the back-drop of the political struggles of the time. Such
a presentation would have helped to highlight even more than it does now
the significance of the difference between legal and sociological definitions
of crime. This is, nevertheless, a book that deserves a wide and thoughtful
reading by everyone, not only professional criminologists, but lawyers,
businessmen, and citizens in general.
If a major national emergency should come again, drastic economic
controls may be expected to come again. Thoughtful Americans every-
where will need to think seriously about the story and the analysis of the
recent past presented in this book. It may help prevent an even worse
debacle in the future.
George B. Vold t
t Professor of Sociology, University of Minnesota.
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CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS. By Young B. Smith and
William L. Prosser. Foundation Press, Inc., Brooklyn, 1952.
Pp. 1239. $9.00.
Today the teacher of Torts suffers no lack of choice of casebooks.
With Harper's fourth edition of Bohlen still going strong and with Seavey,
Keeton & Thurston a scant two years old, Foundation Press has published
simultaneously a second edition of Shulman & James and an entirely new
work by the deans of Columbia and California. With the other books in
the field, some explanation for the newest one is due, and the authors have
provided it for us in the preface. We are told that the course in Torts is
rather desperately crowded, that the problem always has been how to get
over the ground in the allotted time, and that few teachers ever succeed
in covering the major part of any casebook. The solution offered by these
authors is the resort to a considerable amount of textual material. Reading
no further, we might expect a much foreshortened Torts book, with some
chapters and sections containing only expository statements of the law by
the authors. But read on: "The method adopted has permitted the inclu-
sion, or more extended treatment, of a number of topics of real importance
for which casebooks in this field seldom have found room." And a glance
into the body of the book gives the impression that each topic is covered in
much the usual way: cases followed by notes. The result, at first dismaying,
is a book at least 20 per cent larger than its competitors.
Hence, the book is not a radical departure in approach to the subject,
but rather in the manner of presentation of material. Even this is not too
easily seen. With the exception of introductory statements to a few chap-
ters, the text material is presented in smaller type following the cases; only
one subject, statutory modifications of the trespassing cattle rule, is given
full textbook treatment. The length of these notes and their completeness
is what makes the difference. A number are rather long textual statements
of the law in situations related to the principal case, some giving much
historical background in relatively little space. Others are fairly typical
casebook notes containing primarily references to other cases or source
materials, or various problems on the theme of the principal case, taken
either from cases to which citations are given or from the authors' fertile
imaginations. Even in small type, the notes occupy approximately 30 per
cent of the book. In essence then, what the authors have really attempted
to do is to free the professor from the necessity of lecturing on details by
giving the student the responsibility of reading these extensive notes along
with his cases.
I was once exposed to Prosser as a visiting professor in a short sum-
mer school course. In a maximum of twenty-five class hours, he covered
to his satisfactions (and mine) 790 pages of McCormick on Damages.
He did not, however, inflict thirty-odd pages a day on the student; much
was covered by lecture. As a disciple, I kept up with him, though my feet
may have dragged at times, but as an apostle, I cannot maintain his pace.
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Last year I was one of several guinea pigs chosen to teach from a temporary
(and even longer) edition of the book, and I can report that while the course
was much over-crowded, and while I barely succeeded in covering the
major part of the casebook, I did cover more subjects and left out no greater
proportion of this book than I did of any other. Unfortunately, I found
that either the students or I wanted to talk about all those fascinating notes.
So enough of this silly quarrel with the preface. The book is an
excellent teaching tool for the course. While some reviews of casebooks
consist of comparisons between work5, my commission extends only to
Smith & Prosser, and this review will be confined to personal comments on
it. I see no point in reviewing any particular subject or topic by going
over the cases chosen. I do not believe that a description of the book by
table of contents headings should be necessary. Suffice it to say that in all
respects I found the internal arrangement of material within topics excellent.
The old favorite cases are either there or such clever substitutions have been
made that they are not missed. The student will find new favorites, and
some excellent legal instruction, in A. P. Herbert's discourse on the Rea-
sonable Man 1 and the Ballad of Brimelow v. Casson.2 A great deal of the
book consists of recent cases and it is in every way modern and up-to-date.
The topics that have been added or expanded beyond the usual treatment
are: nuisance, interrelation of tort and contract, problems relating to joint
tort feasors, the apportionment of damages, and survival and wrongful
death actions. Other features of the book are the inclusion of chapters on
conversion, on punitive damages, and on the measure of damages in per-
sonal injury cases. In view of the disappearance of the course on damages
from the curriculum or from the programs of many students, the two latter
chapters seem especially welcome. Rather full treatment of alternative
remedies appears in the chapters on tort and contract, misrepresentation,
and nuisance. The problem of balancing the equities is covered under
nuisance, but it seems unfortunate, if equity has disappeared from the par-
ticular school's curriculum, that parallel treatment was not given to bal-
ancing the equities in the trespass cases.
I have some minor quarrels with the external arrangement of topics.
I find it strange that the Palsgraf and Wagner cases appear almost at the
beginning of the negligence material, under the heading "Risk to Whom ?",
rather than with the proximate cause materials. The chapter on punitive
damages seems out of place; though connected in a sense with the inten-
tional wrongs which it follows, it is far separated from the other materials
on damages. Some subjects were, I felt, covered in too great detail, by
more cases than absolutely necessary. But these are minor matters, and
by the use of a practice endorsed by one of the authors, 3 they may be turned
into a real advantage. Every Torts teacher may now be his own casebook
1. Instant text at 238.
2. Instant text at 1225.
3. Prosser, Light/wlie No Good, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 257 (1949).
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editor. By using this book, he may cut whole sections; he may cut cases
or notes; he may rearrange at will. Certainly the size of the book and its
wide coverage permit the shaping of the course to suit almost every demand,
even though the teacher finds himself, as I do, talking too much and simply
unable to cover as much material as is so well presented here.
Frank 1. Trelease t
STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS. By Clarence Morris. The
Foundation Press, New York, 1952. Pp. 432. $4.50.
Professor Wigmore's two volume casebook on torts, published some
forty years ago, was a mighty and felicitous effort toward the sources and
philosophy of tort law. Professor Morris seeks and pretends to no such
scope. Instead, addressing himself to both theory and practice, he puts
under one cover eleven of his tort law articles, which were published over
a period of twenty years (1931-1951) in leading law journals.
All the articles except three have to do with negligence. Of the three
exceptions, one deals with "Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction,"
one with "Balancing the Equities" in encroachment-nuisance situations, and
one with "Punitive Damages" in torts generally. (The article on "Bal-
ancing the Equities" was written in conjunction with W. Page Keeton,
Dean of the University of Texas Law School). Of the nine articles on
negligence, four discuss a means of proof: "Role of Expert Testimony in
the Trial of Negligence Issues," "Admissions and the Negligence Issue,"
"Proof of Safety History in Negligence Cases" (with an excelleiht appendix
on Proof of Safety History in Railroad Crossing Accidents, written by
James P. Lee under the supervision of Professor Morris), and "Custom
and Negligence ;" two deal with related topics: "Role of Criminal Statutes
in Negligence Actions," "Role of Administrative Safety Measures in Negli-
gence Actions ;" one deals with "Proximate Cause in Minnesota" (another
reminder of a difficulty because of the mix-up between logic and fate), and
the remaining one with "Torts of an Independent Contractor."
Although each article treats a separate and narrow topic, a broad view-
point is discernible from the whole, for Professor Morris has an ability
to classify and show the pattern in the category. With a provocative choice
of cases for illustration, he gets to the knowledgable point, using specific
cases to deduce the substantive rule. He does not, as Maitland remarks,
smother the plain idea under subtleties and technicalities. And he has the
pedagogic feeling not to move per saltun. In addressing himself to the
lawyer as advocate, his work is more than academic; it is law for lawyers
and student alike.
j Professor of Law, University of Wyoming.
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The author's ability to distinguish different and confusing or confused
problems has resulted in a series of articles that altogether comprise a work-
aday book, with pointers here and there delineating the art (Professor
Morris calls it 'strategy') required of the lawyer trying a negligence case.
His is no barren intellectualism. An instance of his concern for the trial
lawyer is apparent when he says, on the question of the statistical inference
of danger or safety:
"During argument, the defendant's lawyer may be able to caution the
jury against hasty acceptance of a statistical inference of danger in-
hering in the place of injury by analyzing its potential weaknesses."
While he writes for the practicing attorney, Professor Morris' law
comes with a thoroughness that reveals scholarship. His analysis of the
part company safety rules play in the proof of negligence typifies an ability
to enunciate law with advice on advocacy:
"A defendant's own preformed judgment on what he should do is one
of the facts properly taken into account against him. It is not true that
a defendant who does the best he can is free from negligence. The
standard is the care that a reasonably prudent man would take under
the circumstances. But when a defendant fails to come up to his own
concrete standards, his standards are properly taken into account in
judging him. This does not mean that violation of company rules is
negligence per se. Men and organizations have ideals impossible of
accomplishment, and these ideals may affect the drafting of company
rules. Since reasonably prudent behavior may fall short of ideal
behavior, a breach of an announced rule may be reasonably prudent."
Though he will not take the position of postulates, Professor Morris
can be critical of court-expounded doctrine; he writes: "This is an example
of the obdurate use of criminal standards that some courts assume must
be made under the doctrine of negligence per se." I suggest that, assuming
the hazard involved was the one against which the statute was designed to
protect, the use of the criminal standard could hardly be called 'obdurate';
otherwise, the objection is well-taken. See Boyd v. Smith, 372 Pa. 306
(1953). His critique can be pedagogic, as when he illustrates the cor-
responding expansion of tort liability with criminal liability, summing up
in a sentence a weakness of a particular position: "But the Massachusetts
view is a way of closing the court's eyes to a novel fact and thus making old
cases out of new ones." That the author can take a stand is evidenced by
his declaration (which seems to me to be quite so) that "in new fact situa-
tions a court cannot avoid judicial law making," and by his flat statement
referring to a court's refusal to hold that the violation of a sound administra-
tive measure is conclusive of negligence, that the decisions are "unwise in
policy and unsound in principle." Recognizing the problem arising in
questions of violation of criminal and administrative statutes as a basis for
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a finding of negligence, Professor Morris treats the problem as the "statu-
tory purpose doctrine," although his essential question here is the same as
that involved in Professor Eldredge's treatment of it as the "Hazard
Problem." 1
When articles are written separately over a period of years on basically
the same subject there is bound to be repetition or overlapping, noticeable
when they crowd together into one cover. But this very repetition in itself
makes discernible the broad viewpoint of the author, and results in either
simplifying or emphasizing his point of view. The functional viewpoint,
an animated moderation of clear discussion, the author's command of his
own phrase and the comfortable index all recommend this book for the
lawyer's trial and research shelf. Every article is choice, but if I am to
make my preference I would select "Custom and Negligence" and "The
Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions."
Joseph Sloane t
1. Morris, like Eldredge, suggests that defendant's violation of a criminal statute
should be invoked only where the plaintiff is within that class of persons whom the
statute was designed to protect, and when his injury is within the class of injuries that
the statute was designed to prevent. Morris suggests that this doctrine probably
originated as a limitation on liability, but says, "It is susceptible of inverse statement
as a justification of extended liability." He suggests also that Professor Thayer would
sanction the latter view.
t Judge, Court of Common Pleas No. 7, First Judicial District of Pennsylvania.
